Abstract : This paper reviews psychological reasons why the enthusiasm of the general public for free international trade might be less than that of the economist. Six specific reasons are advanced : (1) lay views of utility emphasize employment over consumption; (2) status quo bias results from loss aversion; (3) people think altruistically but parochially; (4) people often consider fairness in bargaining situations; (5) people may hold inappropriate fixed pie beliefs ; and (6) people may misunderstand Ricardo's principle of comparative advantage. The reasons vary in their apparent rationality and appear to operate in concert rather than independently.
Introduction
Ever since Adam Smith's attack on the mercantilist system in The Wealth of Nations, economists have generally favoured free trade. Moreover, many economists hold that the benefits of free trade derive not only from improved access to foreign markets but also from the increased availability of a wide range of imported goods in the home market (Corden, 1974 ; Bhagwati, 1991 ; Irwin, 2005) .
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The existence of such a professional consensus is supported by survey data. Alston et al. (1992) reported the results of a large questionnaire survey of US economists. Over 71 % of them 'generally agreed ' that ' tariffs and import quotas usually reduce general economic welfare ', a further 21 % ' agreed with provisos ', and less than 7 % 'generally disagreed '. Frey et al. (1984) found 57 % of an international sample of economists generally agreeing, and just over 10 % generally disagreeing with a similar question. (The lower percentage of agreement might reflect either the different samples, or the omission of ' usually ' from Frey et al.'s question.) Such professional enthusiasm broadly conflicts with the views of many people. Gomes (2003) has charted a long history of resistance to free trade, and this resistance continues today. Krueger (2004 : 490) comments that ' protectionists enjoy remarkable success around the world '. Consider, for example, recent popular protests against the further liberalization of trade suggested by the World Trade Organization, widespread hostility within both the USA and the European Union to the lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers, and much discussion of the evils of the global economy (e.g. Mander and Goldsmith, 1996) .
Social surveys show that such resistance has a firm foundation in the opinions of ordinary people in developed economies. The 1992 US National Election Survey found 67 % of the respondents favoured ' placing new limits on foreign imports ' (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001) , and a similar survey carried out in 1996 found 52 % agreeing with the same proposal (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006) . Thus, a majority of both US samples preferred increased protectionism to either increased liberalization or maintenance of the status quo. The 1995 International Social Survey Program surveyed 23 countries and 55 % of all the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that their country ' should limit the import of foreign products to protect its national economy ', while 22 % disagreed or strongly disagreed. In only two countries (Japan and the Netherlands) were there more pro-trade (disagree) than anti-trade respondents (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005) .
Economists have long been aware that their views are not always shared by the wider community, but tend to attribute this to economic interests. They recognize that, while free trade may benefit the wider community, it is not usually in the interests of everyone. Those within a community who produce goods that compete with imports are likely to be worse off as a result of such trade (Feenstra, 2004) . Such producers are likely to be a minority within their community. Why then, within democratic communities, do their views sometimes prevail ? Answers to this question have been given by students of political processes (e.g. Mayer, 1984 ; Olson, 1982 ; Rowley, 2001) . For example, dairy producers might persuade a larger political grouping to block the importation of cheaper or better dairy products in return for the dairy producers' support for issues of greater concern to the larger group.
This article focuses on something that economists tend to overlook -the psychological reasons why the views of ordinary people, who are neither economists nor particularly threatened producers, might be hostile to free trade. This does not mean that other reasons are unimportant, but the non-psychological reasons for hostility to free trade are well known. For example, one current source of opposition to trade liberalization is people's fear that the environment is endangered by freeing up trade (e.g. Mander and Goldsmith, 1996) . Environmental damage would obviously be an important non-psychological reason, and current discussion of the issue (e.g., Irwin, 2005 : ch. 2) focuses on the relationship between environmental damage and trade, and under what circumstances freeing up trade might harm or preserve the environment. Another important concern is that globalization might lead to the swamping of minority cultures (e.g. Broude, 2005) .
To date, much psychological research into economic decision-making has considered conditions where market forces apply, and there has been less interest in applying psychology to economic decisions made by governments. Yet psychology may be more rather than less useful in understanding such decisions.
Consider, first, decision processes that are subject to some kind of bias. As McCaffery and Baron (forthcoming: 2) point out : ' In private markets, arbitrage mechanisms, which allow some to profit from the biases of others, with overall prices showing little effect, can be expected to reduce the effects of bias _ In the public sector, however, the absence of any simple, general arbitrage mechanism, such as the market itself _ gives reason to believe that the adverse effects of cognitive biases can persist for long periods of time.' Government controls on trade reduce the effect of arbitrage mechanisms, and, in turn, lower the chances of reducing any effects of cognitive biases or misperceptions.
Even if a decision process is not subject to cognitive biases, there is an important role for psychology in helping to determine the utility produced by government decisions. A reasonable, if imperfect, measure of the value of market-supplied goods and services is given by people's purchase behaviour, but this measure is not readily applicable to goods and services supplied by governments. Similarly, government control of trade changes, and in some cases eliminates, the market, and behavioural measures of the value of imported products may thus be either distorted or unavailable. If a government decides to ban the importation of bananas, then the obvious behavioural measure of their utility -people buying and eating them -will no longer work very effectively.
Finally, the general activity of trading is an extremely widespread human behaviour. Ridley (1997) argues that trade may be as old as our species. Horan et al. (2005) suggest that the trading propensity of our early ancestors may have given them a decisive evolutionary edge over Neanderthals. Trivers (1971) reasoned that trade might have its origins in reciprocal altruism. Given this long and extensive context, we would expect a human propensity to develop beliefs, attitudes, and customs about exchange. In particular, we would expect people to be concerned with fair exchange, and with the fair distribution of resources produced by collective but specialized activity. Indeed, this is what we see.
For example, people will often reject outcomes that would benefit them if they perceive another party will derive a greater, ' unfair' benefit. In ultimatum games, two players are offered a resource provided they can agree on its distribution. Player A is first given the choice of how the resource should be divided, and player B can then only accept or reject the suggested division. If B accepts, the resource is divided according to A's suggestion ; if B declines, neither A nor B gets anything.
The game theoretic solution suggests B should accept any positive offer, and thus that A should offer as little as possible. In practice, no culture has yet been found in which many players follow the game theoretic solution. B players frequently reject the offer of small proportions of the resource, and A players often offer half of it (e.g. Gü th et al., 1982 ; Gü th and Tietz, 1990 ; Henrich et al., 2005) .
As a second example, there has also been considerable research into the way that children believe resources should be distributed, and a number of experiments have investigated whether and in what circumstances children choose to distribute goods equally, according to the input involved in producing them, or according to other criteria (e.g. McGillicuddy-DeLisi et al., 1994) .
Overall, it would be utterly unsurprising to find such beliefs, attitudes, and customs operating in the wider if more impersonal arena of international trade. Indeed, there has been at least one previous suggestion that fairness might be a crucial factor in people's views on trade (Davidson et al., 2006) . Hence, the following section presents six psychological factors that might be influential on people's attitude to international trade.
Psychological factors in trade values

Production versus consumption in human utility
Taken broadly, utility in economics is mostly considered to derive from consumption. Adam Smith (1776 /1904 put it directly : ' Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production ; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer.' When David Ricardo (1817 Ricardo ( /1971 , in demonstrating the principle of comparative advantage, discussed English and Portuguese specialization in the production of cloth and wine, he presumed that people derived most utility from maximizing their consumption of the two commodities.
Similarly, recent expositions of the arguments for free trade concentrate on the expansion of the production possibility frontier and hence consumption possibilities. Economic models define utility in terms of consumption and show how people's utility is affected by changes in income that in turn depend on changes in trade patterns (e.g. Dixit and Norman, 1986 ; Krebs et al., 2005) . In general, much of the argument for free trade in economics rests on utility gains from improved consumption possibilities.
By contrast, many objections to trade liberalization stress the reduction in utility from the loss of employment or, more rarely, deteriorating work conditions. Restrictions on trade are often advocated by workers, for example, US steel workers or European farmers, who are likely to be affected. It has been widely recognized by both psychologists and economists ever since pioneering research during the Great Depression (Eisenberg and Lazarsfeld, 1938 ; Jahoha et al., 1971 ) that employment has value over and above the purchasing power provided by the income people earn.
Recent quantitative evidence on the effects of unemployment comes from largescale studies (e.g. Frey and Stutzer, 2000 ; Lucas et al., 2004 ; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998) in which unemployment has been shown by regression analyses to produce substantial adverse effects on well-being, even when the effects of income have been statistically accounted for. Lucas et al.'s (2004) longitudinal study of a large German sample showed that these effects could persist for years, and do not always vanish when people re-enter the workforce (suggesting that long-lasting disutility also results from being forced to change one's job or occupation).
Research into happiness and well-being shows that people's happiness is heavily influenced by their work satisfaction but little by their income (e.g. Diener et al., 1999) . People's work is believed to provide a structure to their lives, an outlet for their creativity, a source of social contacts, and a sense of identity (e.g. Darity et al., 1999) . A striking demonstration of this phenomenon in recent years is in the continuation of work in some East European concerns even when the workers have effectively not been paid at all (Bojilova, 2006) .
In sum, people derive benefits from their work which go beyond income or the consumption obtainable from this income, and which are not easily compensated for by income changes and adjustments. Thus, there is some distance between the findings of research into unemployment and the viewpoint taken by much economic theory.
Of course, economists are concerned with unemployment and the non-income benefits of work, as well as with the effects of changing trade policy on them. Both economists in general and those who advocate free trade (e.g. Irwin, 2005) have long been aware both that unemployment is a real and serious problem for those affected and that it can follow trade liberalization. An important line of research has been into the actual changes in employment following trade liberalization, with the results suggesting that employment losses from this cause, although sometimes real and enduring (e.g. Kletzer, 1998) , are not invariable and often less than the losses from economic recession or the introduction of new technology (e.g. Papageorgiou et al., 1990 ; Trefler, 2001) . There has been a good deal of attention paid to the issue of how the losers from trade changes might be compensated for their loss (e.g. Dixit and Norman, 1986 ; M. Kemp and Wan, 1986) . There have also been economic models that predict unemployment effects from trade changes (e.g. Jansen and Turrini, 2004) . However, many of these models do not address changes to utility over and above income effects on consumption, and in this respect they do not take account of broader research into the utility of work.
Status quo bias, predicting future utility and loss aversion
This section deals principally with two somewhat different phenomena: the difficulty people appear to have in predicting utility, and loss aversion. The two are among the host of more-or-less interrelated phenomena that have been recently studied by psychological decision-making theorists and behavioural economists. Both suggest a status quo bias in the way people conceive the gains and losses from trade.
Recent years have seen an influx into economics of psychological thinking and results based on psychological experimentation. The work of Kahneman and Tversky (e.g. 1982, 2000) has been particularly influential, and both psychologists and economists have now carried out a great deal of empirical work that has focussed on the decision-making capabilities and performance of individual people. For example, there have been a large number of experiments showing that people may make inconsistent decisions depending on the wording used to inform them of the conditions of the experiment. (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1981 ; for a recent review, see Kahneman and Tversky, 2000) . The effects of these wording changes are often described as framing effects. Such effects surface in real-world situations, as well as in the laboratory. For example, there is good evidence from the USA that people are most likely to sign up for whatever pension plan is framed as the default option (Madrian and Shea, 2001) .
Framing effects probably do have an important influence on the way people think of trade (e.g. Davidson et al., 2006) . Hiscox (in press) asked US respondents whether they favoured or opposed increasing trade with other nations. Significantly more respondents were opposed to trade if they were first informed about the possibility of job losses than if they were given no information or if they were informed about the possibility of lowered prices. Furthermore, the influence of the framing was increased for less-educated respondents.
In general, framing effects could bias people either towards or against any particular trade policy, depending on the frame provided. More specific biases are indicated by research on utility prediction and loss aversion.
In the previous section, we considered the utility people gain from employment as opposed to consumption. However, when people make judgements about a future trade (or any other) policy, often they must judge on the basis of predicted future utility changes rather than any changes they have actually experienced. This raises the question of how good people are at predicting the utility they gain from future situations and activities.
The research done to date indicates that people are generally poor at predicting their future utility and enjoyment, even when the activity, for example, listening to music or eating their favourite ice cream, is quite familiar to them (Kahneman and Snell, 1992 ). An endowment effect, in which people will demand more to give up some good than they would spend to acquire it, has commonly been studied by behavioural decision theorists and economists (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1991) . In one variation of the endowment effect experiments, Loewenstein and Adler (1995) showed subjects a mug (coffee mugs have been a frequently used good in endowment effect research) and asked them to imagine they would be given the mug and what they would be prepared to sell if for. Subsequently, they were actually given the mug and a real opportunity to sell it. The prices asked then rose significantly, indicating that the subjects now valued the mug somewhat more highly than they imagined they would.
In general, research to date indicates that people tend to ignore or misperceive the way their tastes and preferences will change in the future (Kahneman, 1994) . Moreover, people often seem to underestimate their future powers of adaptation, and tend to make judgements that favour maintenance of the status quo.
The straightforward implication for trade policy is that people might underestimate their ability to adapt to the changes produced by a more liberal (or more protectionist) trade regime. However, some caution is needed here. The extent of adaptation to major life changes varies greatly from individual to individual, and perhaps from situation to situation. For example, Lucas et al.'s (2004) study into long-term effects of unemployment found great variation in the ability of individuals to adapt to unemployment.
A status quo bias also results from the phenomenon of loss aversion (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) . Loss aversion has been frequently studied and it has often been found that the gain in utility from receiving, say, an extra $100 is not generally perceived to be as great as the loss in utility from losing $100 (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) . The implication is that, while there might be a net financial gain from liberalization of trade, there need not be a net utility gain. This is especially true if, as we saw in the previous section, the utility loss from unemployment cannot be easily compensated for by making up for the lost income. Even if there is a net utility gain, it is not clear how this should or could be redistributed over the various people affected, because, for example, two different people who are made redundant from the same job may suffer greatly different psychological consequences. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) identified yet another possible source of status quo bias. They show that the bias can result from uncertainty, and in particular from uncertainty about who the individual winners and losers from a policy change might be. At least one economics study, Krebs et al. (2005) , has investigated the theoretical effect of risk aversion on people's attitudes to trade policy. The essential result is that risk aversion, coupled with uncertainty about the effects of trade liberalization, is likely to reduce one's estimates of future utility.
Tovar (2006) has produced and tested a mathematical model of how loss aversion might produce an anti-trade bias in government policy. A basic insight of her model is that industries which experience or face losses will be more motivated to lobby for protection than those who gain from a more open economy, because losses have a greater impact on utility than gains. The more energetic lobbying then results in more protectionism.
Loss aversion does not simply imply aversion to free trade. Certainly, the reasoning above indicates that liberalizing trade may not produce overall gains in utility that parallel the gains to be made in the provision of goods and services. But the phenomenon of loss aversion applies to change in either direction. Indeed, there is some reason to expect restriction of trade might be even more vehemently opposed than liberalization.
One reason for this comes simply from the classic economic argument. Although utility is not completely derived from the provision and consumption of goods and services, the relationship is certainly expected to be positive. Ceteris paribus, restrictions of trade should produce lower overall utility than its liberalization.
A more complex argument arises from the shape of the utility function. Figure 1 depicts its likely form, as based mostly on the results of experiments where people have been asked to choose between different gambles (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) . Note, first, that the function graphically depicts loss aversion in that it is more steeply sloping for gains than losses. More subtly, however, the slope of the function changes as the extent of the loss (or gain) increases. In particular, the function is more steeply sloping for small losses (and gains) than for large losses. Now consider a restriction of trade that is carried out to protect workers and owners of a particular industry. Such changes will produce moderate financial gains to the relatively few affected workers and owners, and small financial losses to the relatively numerous rest of the community. However, when we consider utilities, the small financial losses (to the community) should be magnified to more substantial utility losses, and there is relatively more magnification for the small losers than for the moderate winners (the workers). Thus, the model appears to predict, because of the way that the utility losses change evermore gradually as the financial loss increases, that the overall utility losses when trade is restricted should be greater than when it is liberalized.
Overall, loss aversion suggests people will resist changes in the status quo with respect to trade regulation. Loss aversion provides an account of why trade liberalization should be opposed, but it suggests trade restriction should also be opposed. (One additional complication could also be noted. If a worker's job in an existing industry is threatened by new competition from outside under an unchanging tariff and importation regime, is the status quo the retention of his job or the retention of the existing trade policy ? Clearly, this depends on which might be framed as the status quo, as well as on who is asked.)
Finally, although the recent empirical research carried out by those interested in behavioural economics and decision making produces both solid evidence for status quo bias and, more importantly, insight into the conditions that produce it, the existence of the bias has long been acknowledged. In the field of trade, Corden's (1974 : 5) conservative social welfare function recognized that an increase in income is likely to produce a smaller positive effect on welfare than the negative effect produced by a similar income decrease. Corden, too, saw this function as an explanation of reluctance to reduce tariffs.
Altruism and parochialism
It has long been noticed that those who produce goods at a price greater than they could be imported for tend to oppose the importation of such goods, and they band together so as to lobby governments and persuade the general public that the importation should be restricted. There has also been attention paid to the occasional ability of such groups to lobby successfully, even though the benefits of restricting imports may only be enjoyed by a small minority of the electorate (e.g. Olsen, 1982) .
From a psychological point of view, the question is not so much why the producers or the politicians who represent them behave as they do, but why the public might be happy to go along with them. Answers to this question include the frequent cohesion and organization of the producers (Olson, 1982) , the probability that individual consumers suffer a small rather than a large financial loss from the import restrictions (although, as we have just seen, research on loss aversion only supports this reasoning for maintenance of existing trade barriers), and frequent uncertainty about the benefits that arise from lifting them (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991) . Another possibility is that the rest of the community might be altruistic. The small material or financial loss is outweighed by utility derived from the belief that they are helping their compatriots.
There is good evidence that altruism is important in people's stances on political and economic questions. For example, many voters in a referendum on a river channelization project in Roanoke, Virginia supported the project even though they would receive no direct benefit from it (Shabman and Stephenson, 1994) . A key determinant of election outcomes appears to be how the nation as a whole is faring rather than how people's own individual economic interest might be affected (Funk and Garcia-Monet, 1997) . Rotemberg (2003) has provided an economic analysis of how altruism might lead to protectionism in both direct and indirect democracies.
Thus, we would anticipate the ordinary citizen's views on trade issues to have an altruistic component. But who should benefit from this altruism ? Consider someone who is thinking about the removal of import restrictions on imported clothing. She has no personal connection with the clothing industry, and would personally benefit from the removal of restrictions. If she decides altruistically, however, she could consider only the interests of her compatriot clothing workers, who would be harmed by the change, or she might also consider the interests of clothing workers in foreign countries, who would benefit from it.
This kind of choice was discussed by Olson (1965 Olson ( , 1982 and has been modelled experimentally in the 'layered prisoner's dilemma ' (Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994 ; Schwartz-Shea and Simmons, 1990) . In this set-up, participants are given the choice of 'cooperating ' or ' defecting'. Cooperation disadvantages the participant and an 'out-group ' but benefits members of the ' in-group ' ; defecting does the opposite. The behaviour varies with the parameters of the experiment (for example, with regard to whether the participants can discuss the situation), but it is quite common for participants to choose a course of action which benefits the ingroup at the expense both of the participant him-or herself and the 'wider community ' (ingroup+outgroup).
Such behaviour may be termed parochialism (Schwartz-Shea and Simmons, 1991). Baron (2001) investigated whether some parochialism might be the consequence of a ' self-interest ' illusion in which people see themselves as benefiting from a sacrifice they make for their group, even when in fact they do not. He found the self-interest illusion increased from a simple individual and one-group situation to the individual and two-group situation of the layered prisoner's dilemma, and that it decreased when the participants were made to calculate the actual outcomes mathematically.
Extrapolation to trade suggests people might favour import restrictions that benefit their compatriots, even though these restrictions are neither in the interests of the individual nor of overall benefit to the world. There is some empirical support for this extrapolation. Baron and Kemp (2004) had respondents complete a scale measuring their tendency to think of the global versus the nation good (by including such questions as ' National governments should put the interests of the world as a whole ahead of their own national interests '). Attitudes towards the restriction of imports were also measured. As expected, there was a moderate positive correlation between the tendency to favour the national over the global good and the tendency to favour import restrictions.
To summarize, individuals often think beyond their own narrow self-interest when considering government economic policies in areas such as trade. However, this altruism may extend only to co-nationals, rather than to everyone affected by these government decisions. The circumstances under which this extension may occur are not well understood at present.
Trade and bargaining
Suppose two countries, A and B, have trade barriers against each other. B is unwilling to lower its own trade barriers. What should A do ? Economic theory is not completely clear-cut on this issue, but many economists believe A would gain by lowering its own trade barriers anyway (e.g. Bhagwati, 2002) . Similarly, if B were to unilaterally increase its trade barriers, economic theorists often suggest that A would gain little by raising its own in retaliation.
In practice, it seems uncommon (although not unknown) for countries to lower their trade barriers unilaterally, and it is quite common for countries to retaliate against the trade restrictions of other countries by imposing their own. Both reluctance to liberalize trade unilaterally and retaliation to barriers imposed by another country are understandable in terms of research into how individuals perceive fairness and how individuals react to apparently unfair treatment.
Earlier, a little of the research on fairness, and in particular research on the ultimatum game, was outlined. Very briefly, this work indicates that people are often reluctant to accept deals in which it appears that another party gains considerably more than they do. It is completely plausible, especially in light of the research discussed in Section 2.3, that an individual -whether as a trade negotiator or simply a citizen -would also be unwilling to accept a trade deal that is offered their country (or perhaps other group) if another country is perceived to gain more from the deal. So, for example, suppose an individual perceives her own country, A, as gaining 2 units of perceived utility from opening its borders to B's imports and 4 units of perceived utility from B opening its borders to A's exports. B is perceived to have similar expected gains. Clearly, A would benefit from unilaterally opening its borders regardless of what B does. However, the ultimatum game results suggest that a citizen of A might be hostile to this action because B is perceived to 'unfairly ' gain more from it. (For further discussion of the possible impact of considerations of fairness on trade policy, see Davidson et al., 2006.) There is some evidence indicating ordinary people do think along these lines. Baron and Kemp (2004) found people's willingness to restrict imports from other countries was heavily dependent on the other country's behaviour. Indeed, perceived reciprocity in this study produced larger effects on willingness to restrict than either the nature of the present status quo or whether one's own compatriots were likely to suffer unemployment.
Fixed pie beliefs
The fixed pie belief occurs when two or more concerned parties believe that a gain to one must be a loss to the others. There are real-life situations where the belief is accurate ; most obviously, when an actual pie must be divided between two or more people. But there are also situations where a gain to one party may be in the interests of other, apparently opposing parties. For example, a union's desire to protect workers at an industrial plant from injury may also benefit management. It is well documented that people often do hold and act on inappropriate fixed pie beliefs, especially in negotiation situations (see, e.g., Bazerman et al., 1999 Bazerman et al., , 2001 Pinkley et al., 1995) . Thus, management might oppose a union proposal simply because it wrongly believes that what is good for the union must be bad for them.
Economic theory has, of course, long held that the benefits of trade come from enlargement of the pie. However, it is quite likely that many people do not see it this way and instead believe that countries that benefit from trade only do so by exploiting other countries, not by benefiting them as well. Note here, incidentally, that, as for bargaining, although it is the individual's views that are important, her views concern the benefit to her country rather than to herself directly.
Failure to understand comparative advantage
Part of the argument for free trade derives from Ricardo's principle of comparative advantage. Ricardo argued that one need not be the most efficient producer of any commodity at all in order to have something to offer in the trade process. His original example (Ricardo, 1817 (Ricardo, /1971 considered an economy of two countries, England and Portugal, both of which can produce two commodities, cloth, and wine. Ricardo posited that England can produce cloth using 100 units of labour and wine using 120 units of labour ; Portugal can produce cloth with 90 units of labour and wine with 80 units of labour. Although Portugal can produce both commodities more efficiently than England, the production and consumption of both commodities is maximized if Portugal specializes in wine and England in cloth. One way of summarizing the principle is to say that the determinant of where the goods should be produced is the ratio of the costs of production (comparative advantage) rather than the absolute costs (absolute advantage).
Ricardo's principle is not obvious. Samuelson, in response to the challenge of finding a theory in the social sciences that was both true and nontrivial, famously chose this principle, remarking ' that it is not trivial is attested by the thousands of important and intelligent men who have never been able to grasp the doctrine for themselves or to believe it after it was explained to them. ' (Samuelson, 1972 : 683) . Krugman (1994) gives a number of examples of eminent people apparently misunderstanding it, and goes on to suggest that resistance arises because it is not new, because understanding it requires knowledge of a number of other economic concepts, and because it is grounded in a mathematical model.
If ' important and intelligent men' have difficulty understanding and applying the principle, it would not be surprising to find the average person also had a limited understanding of it, or to find those who misunderstand more likely to advocate restrictions on international trade. Baron and Kemp (2004) administered various tests of the principle to members of the general public, presenting them with scenarios such as the following and then asking how production should be allocated so as to maximize production :
Two branches of a firm, both within one country, make parts for a motorbike. Branch A can make engines at a cost of $100 each and frames at a cost of $80 each. Branch B can make engines at a cost of $80 [for an easy, $180 for a hard condition] each and frames at a cost of $100 each _ Think about how you would allocate work to get the most production.
People's answers, especially where they had to consider comparative rather than absolute advantage, generally did not maximize production, indicating imperfect understanding of the principle. More importantly, those individuals with lesser understanding of the principle tended to favour restricting imports.
A corollary to the principle of comparative advantage may also be unappreciated by lay people. Suppose for the moment that in Ricardo's example only labour costs were important in determining the cost of cloth and wine (i.e. the advantages come about because of differing worker skills). In this case, maximizing production would come about through wage inequalities : the more efficient Portuguese workers would be paid more than their English counterparts, driving production of cloth out of Portugal and into England.
Opposition to trading with poorer countries on the grounds either that their workers are exploited (because they are less well paid than one's own) or that their workers have an unfair advantage (because they are willing to work for less than one's own) also constitutes resistance to applying the principle of comparative advantage. It is thus an interesting question whether people who oppose trade because of differing wage levels do so because they misunderstand how the principle of comparative advantage might work.
Putting together and assessing the psychological factors
Combining the factors
The effects of the factors just reviewed on people's thinking about trade appear to be cumulative rather than independent. We would also anticipate the psychological factors to combine with the non-psychological factors. For example, special interest groups lobbying for protection of their particular industry are likely to appeal to the altruism (or parochialism) of their compatriots. Two further examples illustrate possible combinations of the psychological factors:
Jane may oppose her country importing clothing from a poorer country because clothing workers in her own may become unemployed. Her opposition would thus depend on an altruistic but parochial concern for other people in her own country, and on her belief that people derive utility from the work they do as well as from their consumption.
Bruce opposes his country importing from Ruritania because Ruritania places heavy import restrictions on goods produced in his own country. Bruce's opposition depends on both his perceptions of fairness, and on his applying his judgements of fairness to his country (i.e. parochially). His views may also depend partly on a fixed-pie belief.
Rationality and irrationality
Section 2.2 briefly introduced some of the empirical and theoretical research work carried out by decision theorists and behavioural economists. The work carried out by these researchers is too diverse and innovative to categorize simply, but much has concentrated on decisions that appear not to be rational. So, for example, the ' Asian flu ' experiments show that people make different decisions depending on whether the framing of the problem focuses on survivors or victims of the outbreak of a fatal disease (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) . People appear to act irrationally in that they decide inconsistently or not in their own best interest. We can ask whether the six factors outlined above also feature irrational processes.
There is a wealth of evidence indicating that people's happiness and well-being strongly relate to work satisfaction. Individual utility functions depend on the nature of work as well as on the money people earn that they can then use for consumption. Hence, it must be rational for people to consider effects on their work as well as on their consumption when they think about trade. At the other extreme, a misplaced belief that trade gains constitute a fixed pie or failure to understand the principle of comparative advantage can probably be considered irrational, no matter how common these errors might be.
The other factors are more difficult to categorize. Tversky and Kahneman (2000 : 157) ask whether loss aversion is irrational, and suggest that at least some components of it appear to be rational. A value function that is more steeply sloping on the losses side ' appropriately reflects three basic facts : organisms habituate to steady states, the marginal response to change is diminishing, and pain is more urgent than pleasure. The asymmetry of pain and pleasure is the ultimate justification of loss aversion in choice.' Thus, ' a decision maker who seeks to maximize the experienced utility of outcomes is well advised to assign greater weights to negative than positive consequences ' (Tversky and Kahneman, 2000 : 157) .
On the other hand, an individual's loss aversion is influenced by how he or she brackets the experience with others. Thaler (1999) considers the case of people who might reject a single bet (for example, a 50 % chance or either winning $200 or losing $100) but accept a series of such bets. The difficulty for a rational explanation here arises with why an individual with a reasonable total wealth would reject the single bet. A status quo bias arising from an individual's inability to predict his future tastes also may not be rational, especially if (as in Kahneman and Snell, 1992 ) the situation is one in which the individual does appear to have enough information to predict a taste change.
It is similarly not easy to know whether altruism and parochialism are rationally considered in the context of trade or not. People are in practice more likely to be sympathetic to the fate of their countrymen (even if they do not know them personally) than of those who live in other countries and about whom they are likely to be less well informed. On the other hand, people who take part in layered prisoner's dilemma games are sometimes subject to a self-interest illusion in which they see themselves as benefiting more from the general good fortune of their own group than they actually do. When this is brought to their attention, their cooperation with the group decreases (Baron, 2001) . Furthermore, the apparent worthiness of the out-group can be affected by discussion (Schwartz-Shea and Simmon, 1990) . Extension of these experimental findings to trade suggests, for example, that the relative weight people might give to the welfare of clothing workers in their own country (and why not in their own city ?) versus those in a foreign country could be affected by attitudinal manipulations and framings of different sorts. At this point, it becomes more difficult to consider fellow feelings as strictly rational.
Finally, with respect to bargaining, is it rational to reject a good outcome (the consequence of ridding oneself of import restrictions) in favour of a better one (ridding oneself of import restrictions and having other countries do so as well) ? What should an individual think of this ? Trade negotiations are not a single ultimatum game ; it is quite possible that country A might make a larger gain in utility by holding out until country B reciprocates. Indeed, it is conceivable that A might gain more utility from trade negotiations with B (and C and D) by not accepting short-term gains and refusing to accept deals that give other countries more utility than it receives itself (see Frank, 1988) . One consideration in this case may be the relative power of the countries. Seen from the national point of view, if A is much smaller and less powerful than B, A might not be able to influence B's policy at all (Rabin, 1997) . Of course, whether an individual citizen of A would take this or similar considerations into account is quite another matter. In short, the question is not simple to answer.
More could obviously be said about the rationality of the different psychological factors. One might even debate what it means to be rational (e.g. Singer, 1999 ). However, it should at least be clear that the psychological factors differ in the apparent extent of their rationality, and that taking account of psychological factors in trade is not the same thing as simply considering factors that are completely irrational.
Psychology and politics
Broadly speaking, there are two different ways for lay opinions to affect trade policy. In the first place, trade negotiators and politicians are themselves human, and often have neither specialized economic training nor a substantial personal interest in any particular industry. Thus, if there are general psychological reasons to resist free trade, we would expect decision makers or negotiators to share at least some of them with ordinary citizens. Note, too, that when ordinary citizens are questioned about trade in the research reviewed above, they are often effectively asked to put themselves in the place of a decision maker. For example, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) asked people whether they favoured placing limits on imports ; Baron and Kemp (2004) asked people to indicate their preferences for importing goods from a foreign country under different conditions. Secondly, in a democratic society the views of ordinary citizens influence those responsible for negotiating (or not negotiating) trade deals, either because the negotiators are elected and thus constrained by voters, or because the negotiators are to a greater or less extent controlled by the elected representatives. The extent of voters' influence in any area of government policy is debatable. For example, the views of the majority, or those of the median voter (the voter who is right in the middle on a particular issue), are not decisive in determining the level of provision of public goods (e.g. Kemp, 2002) . The social survey results presented in the introduction indicate that trade policy is no exception and that governments, or at any rate many western governments in the 1990s, do not follow the generally more protectionist policy desired by the median voter. Possibly government trade policies sometimes reflect a compromise between those desired by the electorate, and those advocated by economic experts. As the latter are more likely to improve general welfare, and the electoral fate of governments seems to be determined mainly by the overall state of the economy (e.g. Alvarez et al., 2000) , this seems a plausible way for governments to behave. Davidson et al. (2006) suggest that keeping the public away from trade negotiations serves to advance more liberal trade policies than would otherwise be achieved. Finally, Hiscox's (in press) demonstration that the extent of people's surveyed opposition to free trade is subject to framing effects indicates that governments might reasonably expect to be able to reduce the opposition by appropriate marketing.
Conclusions
A full understanding of how psychological factors interact with economic and political factors to produce people's attitudes to trade would have important implications. Some factors, for example, the representation in utility functions of employment values that are not easily compensated for by income, suggest changes to economic models of the benefits of trade. On the more practical side, knowing more about psychological factors might help counter negative aspects of changes to trade policy. Greater education of the public, with respect to the fixed pie fallacy or the principle of comparative advantage, might also be suggested.
Our present knowledge of psychological factors in trade is incomplete, perhaps primitive. Little empirical work has been done, and the previous discussion has often been based on extrapolating principles derived from studying other areas. For example, it is plausible, but it has not been demonstrated, that many people believe that one country's trade benefits arise only if other countries lose proportionally.
However, a start has been made, and interesting results have already emerged from the analysis of surveys containing attitude to trade questions. For example, people with higher skill and education levels are generally less likely to favour new trade barriers, at least in more developed economies (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005 ; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001 ). This result could be interpreted as a rational response to the increased likelihood for the lower skilled to lose their jobs to cheap foreign competition, but it is also possible that higher skilled and educated people are more pro-trade because of their greater exposure to economic ideas. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) suggest the latter is more likely, because those who have retired from the work force retain the attitudes appropriate to those with the same skill and education level who are employed. However, this result could also be explained by retirees feeling disproportionately altruistic to workers similar to themselves. Moreover, Baron and Kemp (2004) found understanding of comparative advantage to be relatively poor even among the educated.
Further empirical research is needed to establish both the psychological factors that do affect people's trade attitudes and their relative importance. The psychological factors reviewed generally predict that ordinary people might often be less keen on trade liberalization measures than economists, and it is very unlikely that this list exhausts the potential factors. When we add non-psychological factors (e.g. capture of the political decision making by lobby groups, environmental factors), the brief conclusion must be that the opposition of many people to free trade is, if anything, over-determined. Which, then, are the crucial factors in this opposition ? Are these important factors to be countered by education or institutional change or do they suggest some fundamental rethinking of the optimal trade policy ? The task of determining the relative importance of the factors is more difficult because, as we have seen, they often operate together rather than independently. Moreover, we should not expect different factors necessarily to have the same importance in rich and poor countries, in large and small countries, or all communities within the same country. However, the apparent worldwide hardening of opposition to free international trade indicates that finding answers to these questions is important.
